



















































































































































































































































































subject to S <:PY +(l P )(S ＋む）
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13）追加的な効用はu(tw., tw,)-u( tm., tm，） であり，貨幣換算できるも
のとする．点w，の座標は（ tw,, tw，），点、m，円座標は（ tm,, Im，）とする．
ω 0孟P亘1,s＋百一Y>Oであるので，次円行列式は正となり， Z階の条
件は満たされている。I c，，一弥2叩恥 1/P I>0 
s ＋百 y Pl 
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四 EAVOIDANCE OF X-Il可EFFICIENCY
IN THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 
ぐ宅Summary>
E五saoShibahara 
A modem firm is a human organization composed of stockholders 
(p血cipals),m阻 agers(high田tagents), administrato四（刷出eragents）四d
workers (agents). In叩 org阻i回目onwe c四 seeagency relatmnships be-
ing formed. In the present paper, I have made it clear也atX-inefficiency 
occurs in agency田fationshipsbetween highest agents阻 dagents，血dI 
have found that production function may be flexible. 
Furthermore, I have approached the ave四ionproblem in X-ineffi-
ciency, which was not dealt m也byLeibenstein, from the standpoint of 
monito血g.If we bear in mind由at血ehighest agent strengthens血e
degree of mo凶tonngof吐ieagent or adiusts the agent’s salary in order to 
avoid X-mefficiency, 1t becomes' cle紅白紙ifthe econonuc envuonment 
turns for the better, the highest agent w迎 adjust也eagent's salary for 
X-i 
if也eeconomic en目ro町nent泊iproves阻 dX-mefficiency。c叩rsm也
吐ieresult世iatthe agent's ac世vityin the org出uzati。nbecomes directed 
at satisちringhis personal aims, the highest agent will not severely monitor 
but instead raise the agent’s salary. Also if the economic environment 
becomes les healthy, the agent w温 notbe able to satisfy his personal 
alms; and出 X-inefficiencydecreases, there will be no resistance to the 
agent's salary being !owe田d.
It was shown也atif the agent’s money value of cheating rises，也e
degree of mo凶tonngbecomes strong and由at,conversely, if the agent’s 
money value of cheating fals, the degree of monitoring becomes weak. 
